



BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURING THE CONTAINER LIFECYCLE

Improving Security with Containers


Laurent Domb, Principal Cloud Solutions Architect
Kirsten Newcomer, OpenShift Product Management

May 2018


NOTHING IS
TRULY SECURE
BY DEFAULT




COMMON SECURITY CHALLENGES



IMPROVED SECURITY WITH CONTAINERS



ELEMENTS OF AN ENTERPRISE CONTAINER SOLUTION



AUTOMATED & INTEGRATED SECURITY



CONTROL


Application
Security

Container Content

CI/CD Pipeline

Container Registry

Deployment Policies



DEFEND

Infrastructure

Container Platform

Container Host Multi-tenancy

Network Isolation

Storage

Audit & Logging

API Management



EXTEND

Security Ecosystem



CONTROL

Secure the Pipeline & the Applications


Container Content

CI/CD Pipeline

Container Registry

Deployment Policies

SECURE THE CONTAINER LIFECYCLE



IS YOUR REGISTRY SECURE & AVAILABLE?

[Amazon Web Services](#) » Service Health Dashboard

Increased Error Rates

We are investigating increased error rates for Amazon S3 requests in the US-EAST-1 Region.

Get a personalized view of AWS service health

Open the Personal Health Dashboard

Current Status - Feb 28, 2017 PST

The screenshot shows the Docker System Status page. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links like Docs, Events, Community, Support, Training, Partners, and Blog. Below the navigation bar, the page title is "Docker System Status". A red banner indicates an "Active Incident" updated 5 minutes ago. Below this, a section titled "General unavailability across our hosted services" shows the status as "Operational". The "Incident Status" is "Operational". The "Components" section lists Docker Registry API, Docker Registry Hub API, and Docker Registry Hub WEB. The "Locations" section lists IAD3. A message at the bottom states: "[Investigating] We are investigating an issue with traffic to our Registry Service." The date and time are February 28, 2017 9:53AM PST and February 28, 2017 5:53PM UTC.

Docker Registry Hub WEB

IAD3

Full Service Disruption

Docker Registry Hub API

IAD3

Full Service Disruption

Docker Registry API

IAD3

Full Service Disruption

CONTENT: USE TRUSTED SOURCES

- Are the container images signed?
- Are the runtime and OS layers up to date?
- How frequently will the container be updated and how will I know when it's updated?

The screenshot shows the Docker Hub page for the image 'Python 3.5 platform for building and running applications' by Red Hat, Inc. The page includes a description, application categories, and a table of registry information.

Python 3.5 platform for building and running applications ☆
by Red Hat, Inc. | in Product Red Hat Enterprise Linux

registry.access.redhat.com/rhsc1/python-35-rhel7 Updated 5 days ago 3.5-22 : Health Index A

Overview Get this image Tech Details Documentation Tags

Description
Python 3.5 platform for building and running Python applications as a reproducible Docker image using source-to-image

Most recent tag View All Tags ▶
Updated 5 days ago 3.5-22

Health Index
A

Application Categories Programming Languages & Runtimes

Registry	registry.access.redhat.com
Namespace/Repository	rhsc1/python-35-rhel7

Red Hat rebuilds container images when security fixes are released

CONTENT: SIGNED IMAGES FROM TRUSTED SOURCES / RED HAT

- Cryptographically verifying that images have come from Red Hat
 - Assure authorship and integrity
 - Enable non-repudiation
 - Red Hat images are signed using Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)

DEMO: RESTRICT REGISTRY ACCESS

```
[root@master ~]# atomic trust show
* (default)          accept
[root@master ~]# atomic trust default reject
[root@master ~]# atomic trust show
* (default)          reject
[root@master ~]# atomic pull docker.io/centos
Pulling docker.io/library/centos:latest ...
FATA[0000] Source image rejected: Running image docker://centos:latest is rejected by policy.


[root@master ~]# atomic pull rhel7/etcd
Pulling registry.access.redhat.com/rhel7/etcd:latest ...
FATA[0001] Source image rejected: Running image docker://registry.access.redhat.com/rhel7/etcd:latest is rejected by policy.

[root@master ~]# atomic trust add docker.io --type insecureAcceptAnything
[root@master ~]# atomic trust show
* (default)          reject
docker.io            accept
[root@master ~]# atomic pull docker.io/centos
Pulling docker.io/library/centos:latest ...
Copying blob sha256:460cfc7e4b3947a4fa549c68cf4f8570be53779725f0c19f3d33d1520b08d3d 69.76 MB / 69.76 MB [=====] 5s
Copying config sha256:e934aafc22064b7322c0250f1e32e5ce93b2d19b356f4537f5864bd102e0531f 2.15 KB / 2.15 KB [=====] 0s
Writing manifest to image destination
Storing signatures
```

PRIVATE REGISTRIES: SECURE ACCESS TO IMAGES



- Manage access to and promotion of images
- Metadata to automate policies for approved use (e.g. dev, test, UAT, production)
- Monitor changes to external sources
- Manage image signatures for your custom containers



OPENSIFT INTEGRATED CONTAINER REGISTRY: LOCAL AND SECURE

RED HAT CONTAINER REGISTRY

Overview

Images

Projects

Images by project

- default
- domb
- kube-system
- logging
- management-infra
- openshift
- openshift-infra

Images pushed recently


All Projects

domb/image-policy-check	:latest	24 days ago
default/registry-console	:3.3	24 days ago
openshift/redhat-sso70-openshift	:latest :1.3 :1.3-18 :1.3-19 :1.3-21	24 days ago
openshift/jboss-amq-62	:latest :1.3 :1.2 :1.1 :1.1-2	24 days ago
openshift/jboss-datavirt63-openshift	:latest :1.0 :1.0-18 :1.0-21 :1.0-24	24 days ago
openshift/jboss-datagrid65-openshift	:latest :1.2 :1.2-13 :1.2-18 :1.2-19	24 days ago
openshift/jboss-processserver63-openshift	:latest :1.3 :1.3-17 :1.3-18 :1.3-20	24 days ago
openshift/jboss-decisionserver63-openshift		24 days ago

RED HAT QUAY.io & QUAY ENTERPRISE



**Securely store
your containers**



**Easily build
and deploy
new containers**



**Automatically
scan and secure
containers**


QUAY APPLICATION REGISTRY

Quay Applications Let you Automate Kubernetes Deployments

Push, pull & discover
Kubernetes applications.

Interact with Helm charts like
you do with container images.


```
$ helm registry install  
quay.io/jzelinskie/nginx
```




The screenshot shows the Quay Applications web interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Applications, Repositories, Tutorial, Docs, and Blog. A search bar is on the right. Below the navigation bar, there's a section for the application 'sir_rob'. The 'Releases' tab is selected, showing a table of releases. The table has columns for NAME, CREATED, and CHANNELS. One release is listed: 0.0.1, created 3 months ago, with no channels. The interface also includes pagination controls and a filter for releases.

NAME	CREATED	CHANNELS
0.0.1	3 months ago	(None)


DESIGN FOR SEPARATION OF CONCERNS



JENKINS-AS-A-SERVICE ON OPENSSHIFT




CONTINUOUS INTEGRATION PIPELINE



EXAMPLE: SMALL LEAN RUNTIMES

Build the app binary and deploy on small scratch images




read more on <https://blog.openshift.com/chaining-builds/>

How to use a non-builderimage for the final application image


CONTINUOUS INTEGRATION MUST INCLUDE SECURITY GATES

- Integrate security testing into your build / CI process
- Use automated policies to flag builds with issues



MANAGING CONTAINER DEPLOYMENT

- Secrets
- Deployment policies
- Image signing
- Monitor for new vulnerabilities



SECRETS MANAGEMENT

- Etcd secrets encrypted by default
- Flexvolume API supported for easier integration with 3rd party vault solutions
- Use Node Authorizer & Node Restriction Admission to prevent Pods from gaining access to secrets, configMaps, PV, PVC or API objects from other nodes



oadm policy remove-cluster-role-from-group system:node system:nodes

CONTAINER DEPLOYMENT PERMISSIONS:

Security Context Constraints

```
[root@osemaster ~]# oc get scc
NAME      PRIV  CAPS  SELINUX  RUNASUSER  FSGROUP  SUPGROUP  PRIORITY  READONLYROOTFS  VOLUMES
anyuid    false []    MustRunAs  RunAsAny   RunAsAny  RunAsAny  10         false           [configMap downwardAPI emptyDir persistentVolumeClaim secret]
hostaccess false []    MustRunAs  MustRunAsRange  MustRunAs  RunAsAny  <none>     false           [configMap downwardAPI emptyDir hostPath persistentVolumeClaim secret]
hostmount-anyuid false []    MustRunAs  RunAsAny   RunAsAny  RunAsAny  <none>     false           [configMap downwardAPI emptyDir hostPath nfs persistentVolumeClaim secret]
hostnetwork false []    MustRunAs  MustRunAsRange  MustRunAs  MustRunAs  <none>     false           [configMap downwardAPI emptyDir persistentVolumeClaim secret]
nonroot   false []    MustRunAs  MustRunAsNonRoot  RunAsAny  RunAsAny  <none>     false           [configMap downwardAPI emptyDir persistentVolumeClaim secret]
privileged true  []    RunAsAny   RunAsAny   RunAsAny  RunAsAny  <none>     false           [*]
restricted false []    MustRunAs  MustRunAsRange  MustRunAs  RunAsAny  <none>     false           [configMap downwardAPI emptyDir persistentVolumeClaim secret]

[root@osemaster ~]# oc describe scc restricted
Name: restricted
Priority: <none>
Access:
  Users: <none>
  Groups: system:authenticated
Settings:
  Allow Privileged: false
  Default Add Capabilities: <none>
  Required Drop Capabilities: KILL,MKNOD,SYS_CHROOT,SETUID,SETGID
  Allowed Capabilities: <none>
  Allowed Volume Types: configMap,downwardAPI,emptyDir,persistentVolumeClaim,secret
  Allow Host Network: false
  Allow Host Ports: false
  Allow Host PID: false
  Allow Host IPC: false
  Read Only Root Filesystem: false
  Run As User Strategy: MustRunAsRange
    UID: <none>
    UID Range Min: <none>
    UID Range Max: <none>
  SELinux Context Strategy: MustRunAs
    User: <none>
    Role: <none>
    Type: <none>
    Level: <none>
  FSGroup Strategy: MustRunAs
    Ranges: <none>
  Supplemental Groups Strategy: RunAsAny
    Ranges: <none>

[root@osemaster ~]#
```


RESTRICT WHERE YOU CAN PULL FROM

imagePolicyConfig:

allowedRegistriesForImport:


- domainName: registry.access.redhat.com
- domainName: registry.connect.redhat.com
- domainName: quay.io

DEMO: Deny Docker.io




Demo Flow Image Signing Request

Content Metadata



Vulnerability Scanning - Clair

Content Metadata







CI/CD

QUAY: BUILD TRIGGERS & NOTIFICATIONS

Content Metadata

Create Build Trigger ▾

-  GitHub Repository Push
-  Bitbucket Repository Push
-  GitLab Repository Push
-  Custom Git Repository Push

Configure Trigger

Configure trigger options for  sir-rob/simplewebapp

- ☒ Trigger for all branches and tags (default)
Build a container image for each commit across all branches and tags
- ☐ Trigger only on branches and tags matching a regular expression
Only build container images for a subset of branches and/or tags.

🔔 Create Repository Notification

Notification title:

(Optional Title)

When this occurs:

 Package Vulnerability Found

With Minimum Priority
Level of:

Then issue a:

(Notification Action)

-  Push to Repository
-  Dockerfile Build Queued
-  Dockerfile Build Started
-  Dockerfile Build Successfully Completed
-  Dockerfile Build Failed
-  Package Vulnerability Found

CI / CD

ALWAYS PULL BUILDER IMAGE

Content Metadata

ImageStream Events

☒ Always pull the builder image from the docker registry, even if it is present locally

Push To

Image Stream Tag

alwayspull

/

ruby-ex

:

latest

CI / CD

GET UPDATED BASE IMAGE

Content Metadata

ImageStream Events

Triggers [Learn More](#)

GitHub



.....




[Add Webhook](#) | [Create New Webhook Secret](#)

Image change

☒ Automatically build a new image when the builder image changes [?](#)

CI / CD

Content Metadata



VULNERABLE? OPENSIFT TAKES ACTION!

Content Metadata

Default Policy

```
openshift.io/ImagePolicy:
  configuration:
    apiVersion: v1
    executionRules:
      - matchImageAnnotations:
          - key:
              images.openshift.io/deny-execution
              value: 'true'
            name: execution-denied
            onResources:
              - resource: pods
              - resource: builds
            reject: true
            skipOnResolutionFailure: true
    kind: ImagePolicyConfig
```

Image Annotation


```
image.openshift.io/deny-execution: true
openshift.io/image.managed: true
security.manageiq.org/failed-policy:
  openscap policy
```

CI

CD

CONTINUOUS SECURITY

Continuous Integration / Continuous Deployment / Continuous Security



Trust is temporal: rebuild and redeploy as needed



DEFEND

Secure the Infrastructure

Container Platform

Container Host Multi-tenancy

Network Isolation

Storage

Audit & Logging

API Management

CONTAINER HOST & MULTI-TENANCY

THE OS MATTERS

RED HAT ENTERPRISE LINUX



Atomic Host / RED HAT CoreOS

THE FOUNDATION FOR SECURE, SCALABLE CONTAINERS

A stable, reliable host environment with built-in security features that allow you to isolate containers from other containers and from the kernel.

Minimized host environment tuned for running Linux containers while maintaining the built-in security features of Red Hat Enterprise Linux..

SELinux




Kernel namespaces

Capabilities

Cgroups

Seccomp

BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER



CONTROL
Application
Security



DEFEND
Infrastructure



EXTEND

RELATED SESSIONS

Today

OpenShift for operations - S1225 (Thu, 1 pm, Moscone West 2003)

Building production-ready containers - S2105 (Thu, 3 pm, Moscone West 2002)

I'm a developer. What do I need to know about security? - B1046 (Thu, 3 pm, Moscone West 2103)

Previous - check for slides/recordings

Automating OpenShift Secure Container Deployment at Experian - S1689 (Tue)

Red Hat API management: overview, security models & roadmap - S1896 (Tue)

Network security for apps on OpenShift - S1220 (Wed)

Security-oriented OpenShift within regulated environments - S1778 (Wed)

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

[Ten Layers of Container Security](#)

[Openshift Security Guide](#)

[Container Image Signing Integration Guide](#)

[OpenShift and Network Security Zones: Co-existence Approaches](#)

RED HAT
SUMMIT

THANK YOU



plus.google.com/+RedHat



facebook.com/redhatinc



linkedin.com/company/red-hat



twitter.com/RedHatNews



youtube.com/user/RedHatVideos



EXTEND

Leverage the Ecosystem



Aporeto



AquaSecurity



Avi Networks



big switch



Black Duck



Cisco Contiv



Contrail



dynatrace



f5



JFrog, Inc.



HashiCorp



NeuVector



NGINX



nuagenetworks



Portworx



Thales e-Security



Signal Sciences



Sonatype



Sysdig



Tigera



Treasure Data



Tremolo



Twistlock

OPENSIFT PRIMED PARTNERS